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Members of the Board of Trustees, 
Members of the Academic Staff and of the Administrative Staff of 
the Institute of Social Studies, 
Participants in Co~trses of the Instit~tte of Social Studies, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
1. The s'lttbiect matter 
Development planners are sometimes accused of having too much 
confidence in their own activities and plans. The economic planner 
in particular is - even in the eyes of some 6f his fellow developers -
a somewhat suspect individual, who has fallen in love with the 
techniques of quantitative economic analysis and policy making, 
who has been blinded to the intangible but profound differences in 
socio-cultural and political environment by his predilection for 
quantifiable economic relationships - a man, in short, who talks so 
often and so loudly about his equations and parameters, his ratios, 
percentages, and GNP estimates, that scientific modesty or a sense 
of inadequacy seem to be alien to his thinking and behaviour. 
I am sure that I will not surprise the audience when I say that to 
me the above picture is a caricature rather than a portrait of the 
economic planner. As always is the case with ~ caricature, there is 
some truth in it - though not necessarily much. However that may 
be, this is not the proper occasion to discuss-this point further, for 
the simple reason that an inaugural address is a monologue in its 
very nature. Perhaps I can weaken the impression that development 
planners behave as if they knew the answers to all questions by 
choosing as the starting point of my short expose a plan, a set of 
policy proposals, that is not going to be realized. Therefore, I should 
like to ask your attention for the Plan that failed. The plan concern-
ed is formed by the proposals for action formulated and accepted 
by the United Nations at the beginning of the Development 
Decade. 
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2. The obfectives ot the Development Decade 
The Development Decade itself has not yet come to an end; it 
covers the period of the nineteensixties. Nevertheless it seems all too 
certain that the objectives formulated six years ago will not have 
been achieved by the end of the decade. What are these objectives? 
The basic statement is found in a resolution of the U.N. General 
Assembly; it stipulates that the objective will be to "accelerate 
progress towards self-sustaining growth of the economy of the indi-
. vidual nations and their social advancement so as to attain in each 
underdeveloped country a substantial increase in the rate of growth, 
with each country setting its own target, taking as the objective a 
minimum rate of growth of aggregate national income of 5 per cent 
at the end of the Decade" (6, p. 7). The minimum annual rate of 
growth of 5 per cent is the only target numerically specified; in 
addition, we find that the following aims in the economic sphere lare 
mentioned: "the reduction of internal disparities within under-
developed countries, the achievement of a high rate of savings 
and investment, and the achievement of a high level of training 
and current developmental expenditures" (6, pp. 9 and 10). But 
the scope of the Development Decade proposals is certainly not 
limited to "economic" objectives only; the General Assembly 
resolution "refers specifically to social advancement, social develop-
ment, land reform, the elimination of illiteracy, hunger, and disease, 
improvements in education and similar measures of social progress" 
(6, p. 9). 
Now what has been achieved so far, and why are the prospects for 
reaching the 0 bj ectives so gloomy? We shall single out a few ofthe 
objectives for further discussion. To begin with, let us see what the 
average growth rate of the "developing" part of the world has been. 
According to the most recent data (7, p. 1; 3, p. 17), the gross 
national product of all less-developed countries taken together in-
creased during the period 1960-1965 at an annual rate of only 4 
per cent, or even slightly less than that. This compares unfavourably 
with the growth rates of the nineteenfifties; the annual growth rate 
was just under five per cent during the first half of the fifties, and 
4.5 per cent during the second half of that decade. Instead of "a 
substantial increase in the rate of growth", as was aimed at, a 
further decline of the growth rate occurred. The minimum rate of 
growth of 5 per cent has been realized in at most one-third of the 
total number of developing countries, and those that did reach or 
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surpass the 5 per cent growth level frequently were the countries 
already better-off within the developing world, such as Greece, 
Israel and Venezuela. 
Another objective of the Development Decade proposals is, a~ 
has already been mentioned, the elimination of hunger. The sad 
truth is that since 1960 per capita production of food in developing 
countries has decreased by two or three per cent (2, p. 15). In 1965, 
at the Development Decade midpoint, food production per head of 
the population was just below the pre-war average: the only region 
that slightly improved its position in this respect, in comparison to 
the pre-war level, is the Middle East. Thanks to increased imports of 
food from high-income countries, per capita food consumption in 
the developing continents probably is just a few per cent higher 
nowadays than thirty years ago (2, p. 33). This implies, nevertheless, 
that the number of people that go hungry is larger today than ever 
before. 
Let us investigate still another objective of the Plan under dis-
cussion. An important element of social advancement or develop-
ment is the creation of a sufficient number of employment oppor-
tunities in order that open or disguised unemployment may be 
cured or prevented. What information do we have on the changes in 
the employment situation during the first half of the Development 
Decade? In point of fact, . statistical data on the employment 
problem are very scanty. For this reason we shall approach the 
matter from another angle. As has been already observed, the annual 
rate of the economies of the developing countries was approximately 
4 per cent during the first half of the nineteensixties. If the average. 
labour productivity would not have increased at all, employment 
similarly would have grown by 4 per cent per annum. However, it is 
likely that there has beert a modest change in the produ~tion struc-
lure, as a consequence of a higher growth rate in manufacturing 
industry than in agriculture. And because labour productivity is 
higher in industry than in agriculture, such a shift towards industry 
should have caused a slight increase in average labour productivity. 
Moreover, technical progress in general may have had some impact 
on production techniques used in developing countries. These two 
considerations lead to the conclusion that average labour produc-
tivity might, after all, have increased somewhat in these countries, 
which would imply that employment has risen by less than 4 per 
cent annually. 
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In developed countries in the West, the elasticity of labour pro-
ductivity with respect to the volume of production may be put at 
something like 0.5. If the same value would hold in the case of 
developing countries, employment would have increased by only 
"2 per cent per year since the beginning of the present decade. This 
figure is presumably on the low side. Averaging the two estimates 
of 2 and 4, we may assume that additional jobs were created at an 
annual rate of about 3 per cent of the population already employed. 
This percentage should be compared with the increase in the supply 
of manpower. Demographic data suggest that the size of~the 
available labour force increases by about 2 per cent per year - a 
figure that soon will rise to 2t or 3 per cent, when the children born 
during the birth wave of the recent past and the present will reach 
the age of 15 years or so, and enter the labour market. If, finally, we 
assume that, on the average, 80 per cent of the available labour force 
in developing countri.es is gainfully employed, we can calculate the 
increase in the rercentage of the employed in relation to the total 
labour force at 0.4 percentage points annually. 
Let me try to put this conclusion in as simple a form as possible. 
If the unemployment ratio was, say, 20 per cent at the beginning of 
the Development Decade, it may be estimated at about 18 per cent 
at the decade's midpoint. In other words, the percentage of the 
unemployed in the developing economies possibly has decreased 
somewhat. The percentage of this decline is, however, so small, that 
in absolute numbers unemployment may still have increased. The 
prospects are that unemployment will rise in the near future, both in 
absolute and in relative terms, unless the growth rate of the less-
develope¢l.. economies is pushed up significantly. 
I have mentioned a few facts which indicate that the Development 
Decade is going to fail in reaching the 0 bj ectives in the fields of (i) the 
growth of national income in developing countries, (ii) the elimi-
nation of hunger, and (iii) the improvement of the employment 
situation, as a basic element in social progress. The time at my 
disposal does not permit a discussion of recent development with 
regard to the other objectives; it is clear, nevertheless, that also 
with regard to matters such as land reform and the reduction of 
internal disparities in the level of material well-being (within less-
developed countries individually) no impressive achievements can 
be put on record. It is altogether a rather sad story that I am telling 
you; but facts are facts, however unpleasant they may be to hear. 
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3. F actors ca~tsing the low rate of growth 
N ow why is it that the development performance in the less-
developed countries has been so disappointing? There is no easy 
answer to that question. Experts from different fields of study are 
likely to offer different explanations - and give different opinions on 
and appraisals of the present-day situation. The anthropologist may 
point to a failure to understand and take into account the value 
. jUdgements and patterns of behaviour of the individual citizens of 
the developing nations. The sociologist may make - I think - a 
similar statement (in a different wording, of course), and indicate 
that still a number of social institutions and customs are in existence 
that block or at least hamper progress on the road of development. 
The demographer has a comparatively easy task in .this team of 
scholars, as we all can easily understand that the amazingly high 
growth rates of population in economies where labour is already 
abundant place a heavy burden on the resources available. The 
political scientist may contribute to our understanding of the 
unsatisfactory achievements by emphasizing the considerable inter-
nal political difficulties that a number of developing countries has to 
face, or by analyzing the consequences of the power structure (and 
its changes) in today's world. 
As I happen to be an economist, I should like to point in particu-
lar to the economic factors which have had an impact on the rate of 
development. We may combine those factors under the heading of 
the limited availability of economic resources. In today's discussion, 
I.want to narrow it down to the shortage of financial means available 
for development purposes, and I shall abstain from considering the 
problems around the supply of skilled manpower and entrepreneurial 
talents. 
4. The two "gaps" in development financing 
In development financing, two aspects are to be distinguished. 
Firstly, the level of savings determines the level of investment; if we 
want to increase the rate of development, we have to raise the 
volume of investment, and consequently the volume of savings. 
Secondly, a certain level of economic activity, a certain level of 
production, will require a certain level of imports - imports of 
capital goods, of raw materials and semi-finished products, and of 
essential consumer goods. The feasible level of imports depends in 
turn on the exports of the..,country concerned. The two.problems in 
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financing economic development are, therefore, how to find the 
funds for increasing investment, and how to obtain an increase jn 
the foreign currency that is available. First and foremost, domestic 
action is needed to solve these problems; from the investment point 
of view, savings have to be increased, aJ;ld from the foreign currency 
point of view, exports should be increa~ed. If domestic measures fail 
to reach the aims, international assistance in the form of capital aid 
is the only possibility to fill the gap. The interesting thing about 
capital aid is that it contributes at the same time to a solution of the 
investment scarcity and of the foreign currency shortage. 
Summarizing: If we want to analyze how problems of develop-
ment financing have limited the possibilities of growth in less-
developed economies during the first half of the Development 
Decade, three central issues come to the fore: 
(a) were domestic savings in ,developing countries inadequate to 
realize the planned rate of growth (the investment aspect)? 
(b) were export receipts insufficient to meet the import require-
ments (the foreign exchange aspect)? 
(c) has the volume of capital aid been smaller than was to be 
expected (which is related to both the investment and the 
foreign currency aspect) ? 
If we try to find an answer to the above questions by stUdying the 
statistical data available for the recent past, we have to be ex-
tFemely careful in interpreting the figures. This is due to the fact 
that the statistical magnitudes obviously al'e ex-post magnitudes; 
that is to say, they indicate what has been realized, and not what 
could have been realized. It is easy to demonstrate that on the basis 
of realizations the savings gap and the foreign trade gap are neces-
sadly the same. Thus, if in any year in the past domestic savings fell 
short of the investment level by a certain amount (which therefore 
must have been covered from foreign sources), the deficit on the 
current account of the balance of payments is necessarily equal to 
that amount. On an ex-ante basis, that is on the basis of intended 
behaviour, the two gaps might well be diffel'ent. It does make sense, 
therefore, to discuss on the basis of ex-ante magnitudes whether 
savings or foreign currency constitutes the real bottleneck for 
economic growth in any particular period of time and for a padi-
cular country. Ex-post magnitudes, on the other hand, do not reveal 
where the greatest problems lie; national accounts do not show 
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items such as "savings disposable but not invested", or "foreign 
currency that could not be utilized because of a slow rate of growth". 
If foreign currency is the bottleneck, part of the intended savings 
will be turned into consumption. If savings are the limiting factor, 
part of the foreign exchange available will be used for non-essential 
imports, or indeed for building up some reserves. The upshot of this 
discussion is that it is impossible to find out, simply by looking at 
some figures, whether a shortage of savings or import difficulties 
were the major factor responsible for the disappointingly slow rate 
of growth in developing countries. Nevertheless, we will try to 
analyze this matter in some more detail. 
5. The gaps quantified in aggregate .analysis 
On the basis of past trends, and with a target rate of growth of the 
gross national product of 5 per cent - the Development Decade 
target -, the U.N. Secretariat prepared estimates which reveal that 
the hypothetical savings gap in 1970 for all developing countries 
together might be of an order of magnitude of i2 billion dollars, 
whereas the foreign exchange gap might be put at 20 billion dollars 
(5, p. 68). The conclusion that can be drawn from such an illustrative 
exercise is, that, even if international capital aid would be forth-
coming to a level of 12 billion dollars anriually (so as to cover the 
savings gap) additional measures would have to be taken to enable 
the developing countries to earn the difference between 20 and 12, 
that is some 8 billion dollars more in foreign currency than they 
could be expected to do if past trends in foreign trade continue. 
This could presumably be understood to imply that the difficulties 
in acquiring enough foreign currency were expected to be greater 
than those in obtaining an adequate amount of investment funds. 
Let us see now how the U.N. estimates compare ~th reality far 
the period 1960 to 1965. No data are available on the aggregate 
savings performance of the developing countries. Nevertheless, it 
seems unlikely, at first sight, that the difficulties of achieving an 
investment level allowing a 5 per cent growth would have been 
unsurmountable. U~ing the U.N. projections as a starting point, and 
assuming the average savings ratio in 1965 to be equal to the one of 
1960, the savings gap would have been 9 billion dollars in 1965. As 
the volume of the long-term capital inflow may be estimated at 6 
billion dollars (9, p. 212), there remain 3 billion doll,?-rs to be covered 
by an increase in the amount of domestic savings. Such an incFease 
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could be brought about by raising iilie average savings rate with 
1 t per cent. This, in turn, could have been realized with a marginal 
savings ratio of 0.20. A value like this would seem to be within reach 
for most developing countries, although it certainly would require 
substantial and concerted efforts from the side of citizens and 
governm'ent. The limited statistical information available on this 
point is not so reassuring, however. In their recent article on 
Foreign Assistance and Economic Development, Chenery and 
Strout present estimates of feasible marginal savings ratios for 50 
developing countries (1, pp. 712 and 713). In the case of the medium-
level estimates, about half of the total number of countries may be 
expected to reach or surpass the 0.20 marginal savings ratio; in the 
more optimistic alternative, all but four countries attain or surpass 
this value. According to the more conservative estimate, on the 
other hand, less than thirty per cent, of the countries reach this 
desirable level of the maJ;"ginal savings ratio (see also 8, p. 16) 
Regarding the foreign trade performance of the developing 
countries in the first half of this decade, optimism seems to be 
justified if we observe the overall growth rates (3, pp. 12-14). 
Exports of the less developed countries to the rest of the world 
increased in these five years at an annual rate of 6 per cent (at 
constant pFices), while the U.N. estimate was 4 per cent only. 
Concerning imports from the rest of the world, the discrepancy be-
tween projection and reality points into exactly the opposite di-
rection; the projected growth was 6.5 pel' cent annually, and actual 
growth came to some 5 per cent only. As a consequence, the foreign 
exchange gap has been much smaller than expected. Visible foreign 
trade virtually balanced in 1965, instead of leaving a 5 billion dollars 
deficit as implicitly foreseen in the U.N, proj ections. Due to payments 
in foreign currency for net imports of services and for foreign factor 
income, an overall foreign exchange gap persisted; its order of 
magnitude may be estimated at 5 billion dollars. As the inflow of 
long-term foreign capital was larger than this, the developing 
countries as a group were ab1e to slightly improve their reserves of 
foreign exchange, not onlyin 1965 but also in 1964 (4, p. 32 and 8, p. 3). 
The preceding analysis has shown that, given the actual level of 
long-term foreign capital assistance, (i) it may indeed have been 
difficult for a number of developing countries to mobilize an 
adequate amount of investment funds, and that (ii) foreign exchange 
receipts have increased more rapidly than usual and were not 
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entirely absorbed by increased imports and other necessary pay-
ments. The conclusion that forces itself upon us is that the invest-
ment-savings gap must have been more difficult to bridge than the 
import-export gap, contrary to what would follow from the pro-
jections of the U.N. Secretariat. However, in pOLllt of fact it is not 
as simple as this. The aggregate analysis in which all developing 
countries are considered together is apt to lead 11S astray in this 
respect. 
6. The gaps for different groups of countries 
Regarding the incEease in foreign currency holdings, it should be 
observed that these improvements were concentrated in a small 
number of countries, primarily the major petroleum exporters. As 
the oil exporting countries so far have not shown much interest in 
putting their reserves to an appreciable extent to the use of less 
fortunate developing countries, we may as well separate them in 
our further analysis from the main part of the developing world. 
It is with this "main part" of the less-developed world that we shall 
be dealing in the following paragraphs. 
The prime reason for the relatively favourable development of the 
exports of the South during the past five or six years is to be found 
\ in the high rate of growth of production in the developed countries. 
Economic expansion. in the West - the major customer for the 
exports from the South turned out to proceed more rapidly than 
expected, and some demand elas,ticities have been underestimated. 
Consequently, less-developed countries could sell considerably more 
to the high-income economies than was expected - according to the 
G.A.T.T. calculations some two-thirds more than the projections 
made by the U.N. Secretariat. (3, p. 13). . 
As the 1965 G.A.T.T. report shows (3, pp. 16-19), the increase in 
exports during the first half of the present decade was distributed 
quite unevenly over the individual developing countries. A sub-
stantial gain in export receipts has been realized in a rather large 
number of relatively small countries. This group of countries ex-
perienced at,the same time a fairly rapid expansion of production 
and income, though at a rate lower than the growth rate of exports. 
Imports went up more rapidly proportionally than gross domestic 
product, but not as fast as exports, with the result that the trade 
deficit of this group has been sharply reduced. One might say that in 
these economies growth has been export-oriented, and export-
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· induced; the foreign trade sector has been a leadpg sector. On the 
other hand, the transmission of the growth incentives and possj-
bilities from the export sector to the rest of the economy was often 
lacking or at least insufficient. The above-mentioned G.A.T.T. report 
states that era large number of these countries are typically 'dual 
economies"in the sense that a moder.n (and generally foreign-owned) 
export sector in mining, forestry or plantations coexists with a 
traditional sector in agriculture, but the links between the two 
sectors are extremely tenuous" (3, p. 17). It is very likely that in the 
economies of the countries under review not the supply of foreign 
currency but the amount of savings constituted the bottleneck 
from the point of development financing; however, institutional 
problems associated with traditional agricultur.e may well have been 
more important in several of these countries than either lack of 
savings Ol~ lack 'of foreign exchange (8, p. 4). 
Not all smaller-sized countries have done equa!ly well in stepping 
up exports. Sometimes the cause of the slow growth of exports 
seems to be clear; sometimes we can only guess at it. Among those 
with a poor export performance we find! for instance, several 
African countries that gained political independence during the 
nineteensixties; we find countries where political tensions led to 
military activities; and we find countries with concentration on one 
or two export products for which world demand has been extremely 
sluggish. One cannot help wondyring whether in some cases the 
absence of foreign-owned export enterprises - as referred to above -
might be partially responsible for weak export performances. I am 
thinking in this connection not so much of their technical ability 
and skill, as of their knowledge of markets and control over distri-
bution channels. For this second group of smaller countries, foreign 
exchange certainly has been very scarce; however, it is not possible 
to state with certainty that it was this factor that limited the 
growth possibilities, as in several countries the availability of 
investment funds' may also have been reduced by the very forces 
that depressed exports. 
For a third group of developing countries the situation is again 
different. Here the supply of foreign currency seems to have been 
the decisive factor in determining the rate of development. This 
group largely consists of the bigger countries (with a population of, 
say, over 25 millions). Their: economies are characterized by the 
following common features: "a very low level of foreign exchange 
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reserves, an extremely reduced share of non-essentials in the total 
import bill, a relatively diversified pattern of output (but not 
necessarily of exports) and a policy of relativ,ely inwardlooking 
growth." (3, p. 18). The engine of growth is the domestic market, 
and due to its comparatively large size, the foreign-trade ratio of 
these countries is low. The foreign trade that takes place, however, 
has become of crucial importance for the expansion of the economy 
as almost all imports are essential goods. The countries in this group 
seem to have lost some ground in world markets to the smaller 
countries, possibly because of a certain neglect of their traditional 
world market products in the desire to diversify product~onand ex-
ports. Also, foreign-owned export firms are either lacking or find 
themselves in weak positions. As in most countries of the third 
group the capacity to import was limited because of slowly growing 
exports; the growth of national income was also limited. There are, 
of course, some cases of more rapid growth such as Mexico (with a 
satisfactory increase in non-traditional exports and a booming 
tourist trade) and Pakistan (with substantial international capital 
assistance), but even in those cases the availability of foreign ex-
change seems to have set the pace for economic growth. 
At this stage of the discussion, we should remember our tentative 
conclusion - based on the aggregative analysis of the two gaps in 
development finance - that very likely it was the investment-
savings gap that has been the dominant factor during the first half 
of the Development Decade. What has been said just now about the 
differences between the three groups of developing countries shows 
that this tentative conclusion cannot be maintained as a general 
proposition. The analysis of the different groups, however rough and 
superficial it may have been, lias demonstrated that the lumping 
together of all developing countries is a rather dangerous procedure 
in assessing their actual needs in the field of development finance. 
Aggregate estimates like those prepared by the United Nations 
Secretariat are not without value, but they should be interpreted 
and handled with great care. 
7. Summary and concluding remarks 
The preceding bird's-eye view of the problems of development 
financing during the first five years of the Development Decade has 
shown the following situation. To the extent that a shortage of funds 
has limited the growth of the less-developed economies during this 
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period - and I, for- one, do think that in many countries limitations 
of the economic resources available did put a brake on growth -
it was the investment-savings gap that dominated in perhaps most 
of the developing countries; but it surely was the ~po:r.t-export gap 
(or rather the limited capacity to import) that proved to be the 
greatest obstacle in the larger developing countries. We cannot say, 
therefore, that the failure to reach the targets of the.Development 
Decade has been caused either by a lack of savings or a lack of 
foreign exchange; this has been different in different countries. What 
we can say, on the other hand, is that with a level of foreign capital 
inflow of, say, twice the present magnitude, the problems of de-
velopment finance would have been solved for practically all 
developing countries - at least as far as the Development Decade 
objectives are concerned. It is another question whether in the long 
run a target !'Cite of 5 per cent growth is not too Iowan aim for 
developing countries; I thmk it is. But at the moment we have to 
recognize that even in the present case of a modest growth target of 
five per cent, the rich countries were unwilling to endorse the plan 
and support it by gradually increasing the flow of foreign aid. In 
fact, during the last five years this flow has been kept at approxi-
mately the level of 1961. The irresponsible behaviour and hypocrite 
statements of governments and citizens of prosperous nations are 
known so well that I do not want to deal with them here. 
My story is coming to an end. Let me briefly resume what I tried 
to explain, and add a few words on prospects and policies for the 
future. We have seen that the hope of achieving substantial progress 
in developing countries during the decade of the nineteensixties is 
likely to be belied by hard facts; ~ true judgment on the situation at 
the Development Decade midpoint inevitably leads to this con-
o clusion. The causes of the inability to reach the objectives may be 
sought in various directions, but it is certain that a shodage in the 
field of development finance has been one of them. This shortage 
may primarily demonstrate itself either in too Iowa level of savings 
or in an inadequate capacity to import due to insufficient export re-
ceipts. Both cases occurred in practice. Roughly speaking the smaller 
countries with a relatively dominating export sector have suffered 
from a lack of savings. The larger countries have run more quickly 
into 0 balance of payments difficulties. The difficulties of financing 0 
development were greatly aggravated by the refusal of the high-
income countries to enlarge the flow of long-term capital assistance. 
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What about the fuhire? Both problems of domestic savings and 
foreign exchange scarcity will continue to impede the developing 
countries for many years to come. At the present slow rates of in-
come growth, a marginal savings ratio of 0.20 or even 0.25 will have 
.a rather limited effect on the average savings ratio. Even if marginal 
savings ratios of this magnitude are forced upon the economy year 
after year, it will take some fifteen years before an average net 
savings rate of 0.18 or 0.20 can be reached. These will be years of 
hardship for the population, with very limited increases in per 
capita consumption. Governments of developing countries will be 
obliged to considerably increase taxation of the higher income 
groups in their countries if social unrest is to be avoided. Major 
efforts should be directed towards improving agricultural output, 
especially of foodstuffs. This may not require too much investment, 
as the problems are to a large extent of a sociological or cultural 
nature. I hope that development sociologists will devote much of 
their time and energy to the agricultural production problem, 
however materialistic and down-to-earth this may seem to be in their 
eyes. Improving food production would ease the solution of the 
balance of payments problems of the larger countries which frequent-
ly are faced with the need to cover local food shortages by importing 
from developed countries. Co-ordination of development plans, and 
paItial or total integration of their economies, may lessen the 
dependency on hard-currency earnings, particularly for the smaller 
developing countries. 
I hope that the establishment of the United Nations Capital 
Development Fund, a few weeks ago, will lead to a substantial 
. increase in the flow of capital to the developing world, but I do not 
see much reason for optimism in this respect. Therefore, developing 
countries will be wise to count on having to navigate largely under 
their own power in heading for development. A successful voyage to 
a future without hunger and misery requires good navigators. To 
contribute to the training of such navigators is a challenging task 
as well as a privilege. 
Members of the Board of Tn6stees, 
When a Dutchman without imagination - a tautology? - tries to 
find a symbolic expression for whatever entity or process he may 
have in Il).ind, he usually ends up with the good, old-fashioned but 
never failing examples of the ship and seafaring life. I am sure you 
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already noticed my lack of imagination when I talked about these 
navigators, a minute ago. You, as the "Reren IX" of this Institute, 
~ have appointed me as one of the ship's officers. I am very grateful I 
indeed for this appointment; I hope to discharge my duties in such ~ 
a way that.my appointment will not lead to your disappointment. 
I want to thank the Minister of Education and Sciences for 
approving the appointment. 
Dear Rector and Colleagues of the Institute of Social Studies, 
An advantage of delivering an Inaugural Address somewhat 
belatedly is that it may have become unnecessary to talk about 
"the hope of good and pleasant co-operation". The new faculty 
member already may have given up all hope in this respect, or he 
may have experienced what initially he could only hope for:. The 
latter is, fortunately, my case. I know that forecasts can be erro-
neous, but I am confident that the future will bring similar positive 
expenences. 
Directors and Staff Members of the Netherlands Economic Institute, 
For almost fifteen years I was associated with the Institute in 
Rotterdam. Fifteen years is, after all, a fairly long period of time 
in a man's life. The years I spent at the Institute have left their 
traces - perhaps in more than one sense, but anyhow in my approach 
to economics, I want to thank all of you, first of all for your friend-
ship, and also for the wonderful opportunity to learn together, 
through our work, to marry theory and practice in economic research. 
I have to mention one of you by name: Dr. Jan Tinbergen, whose 
absence this afternoon is much regretted. For ten years I had the 
privilege of close cooperation with this exceptional man. These ten 
years were my "Development Decade". Thanks to the stimulating 
intellectual and human contact with Tinbergen, the latter develop-
ment decade appar-ently ended successfully. Leaving the Institute 
at Rotterdam, and leaving Tinbergen and his group of people, has 
not been an easy thing for me to do. I know that ties of friendship 
and of affinity in academic interests will be maintained. 
Course participants, students at the Institute of Social Studies, 
When I was a young boy in the City of Rotterdam, and roamed 
along the waterside and the docks, guess what I wanted to be. Of 
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course, a sailor. I am sure I do not look like a sailor: now, except 
perhaps for my cap. But after: all, I do not mind tOb much that the 
dream of my poyhood did not come true. Others may have other 
dreams, which sometimes always remain dr:eams. I also know of 
people that dream about a house to live in, that dream about enough 
food to eat and about some clothing, about ajob to earn some money, 
about medical care and education for their children, about a radio 
perhaps, and about all other things that man can enjoy and that 
often are missed so badly - in one word, people that dream of a life 
that is wor:th to be lived. Let us make the greatest possible efforts, 
both during the period of study at the Institute and when you are 
back againin your home countr:y, to contribute to the building of a 
society in which for everybody these dreams can come true. 
Thank you. 
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